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## SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.

The History of Longstreet's Campaign  
Against Burnside.

## IMPORTANT MOVES.

Burnside Moves from Lenoir  
towards Knoxville.

## FIGHT AT CAMPBELL'S STATION.

Longstreet Fails to Gain the  
Rear of the Union Army.

(Continued from last week.)

General Burnside, having obtained almost undisputed possession of East Tennessee, concluded, about the 1st of November, to place his army in winter quarters at Lenoir's Station. The Ninth Corps, under command of Brigadier-General R. B. Potter, was located in a forest of second-growth pines near the station, which in a short time was converted into a village of comfortable log-houses, in which the troops prepared to make themselves as comfortable as possible.



MAP OF EAST TENNESSEE.

Colonel Chapin's brigade of General White's division of the Twenty-third Army Corps was stationed midway between Lenoir's and London, with pickets on the Holston. Mott's brigade of the same division was posted at Kingston, on the extreme right flank of the line. General Parke, acting as chief of staff of the department, had his headquarters at Knoxville, while General Burnside, and Generals Manson and Potter, in command of the Twenty-third and Ninth Corps, established their headquarters at Lenoir's. General Sanders's division of cavalry was posted by brigades at points south of the Holston, while General Hasell's division and Hoskins's brigade of the Twenty-third Corps, a detachment of dismounted cavalry, and a few skeleton regiments of Tennessee troops held the defenses at Knoxville.

## THE PROPOSED CAMPAIGN.

About this time a camp rumor reached General Longstreet that his corps had been designated for a movement against Burnside. The rumor developed into an order to report at the headquarters of General Bragg on the 3d of November, where, in consultation with Generals Breckenridge and Hardee, a plan was agreed upon which promised success. Longstreet urged that 20,000 men moving rapidly might strike a swift and terrible blow and return to the main army at Missionary Ridge before the object of the expedition could become known to their antagonists.

To effect the withdrawal of so large a force unperceived, Longstreet urged the necessity of retiring the main line to a strong position behind the Chickamauga, in the rear of which the force designated for the expedition could be detached without attracting attention from the Union lines. In this, however, he failed to make any impression upon the mind of the commanding-general. McLaws and Hood's divisions, 12,500 strong, were designated as the force with which to execute the movement. General Longstreet argued the importance of the expedition, and that its success depended upon its overpowering strength, stating his conviction that the two divisions referred to were too weak to operate with that promptness which the occasion required. The consultation ended with orders for him to begin his preparations for the campaign.

## LONGSTREET'S ADVANCE.

General Longstreet at once issued orders for the withdrawal of Alexander's battalion of artillery, and gave the order to McLaws to withdraw his division from its position on Lookout Mountain under cover of night, both commands to proceed to Tyler's Station and take the cars for Sweetwater. Hood's division and Snyder's artillery were withdrawn the following night, their place in the line of invest-

ment being supplied by other troops, and met the cars at the tunnel east of Chattanooga. Like many other important movements in the war, the failure of this may be traced to the neglect of minor details. He was entirely unacquainted with the country, and was unable to procure topographical maps of the proposed route over which his troops were to march. The transportation was so insufficient that he found great delay in getting his troops to Sweetwater, and, having no control of it, had no power to enforce speed of movement upon the railroad officials. When on the point of leaving Chattanooga on the 5th, it occurred to him that as General Buckner had been for nearly a year in command of the district of East Tennessee he should be provided with maps of the country, he wrote him the following letter:

"HEADQUARTERS, CHATTANOOGA,  
Nov. 5th, 1863.

S. B. BUCKNER, Major-General.

"DEAR SIR: I start to-day for Tyler's Station, and expect to get transportation to-morrow for Sweetwater. The weather is so bad, and I find myself so much occupied, that I shall not be able to see you to say good-bye. When I heard the report around camp that I was to go to East Tennessee, I set to work at once to try and plan the means of making the move with security and the hope of great results. As every other move had been proposed to the general and rejected or put off till time made them more inconvenient, I came to the conclusion, as soon as the report reached me, that this was to be the fate of our army, to wait until all good opportunities had passed, and then in desperation to seize the least favorable one.

"As no one had proposed this East Tennessee campaign to the General I thought it possible that we might accomplish something by encouraging his own move, and proposed the following plan, viz: To withdraw from our present lines and to withdraw the forces now in East Tennessee, the latter to give the impression to the enemy that we were retiring from East Tennessee and concentrating near here for battle or for some other movement, and place our army in a strong concentrated position. The moment the army was together, make a detachment of 20,000 to move rapidly against Burnside and destroy him, and by continued rapid movements to threaten the enemy's rear and his communications to the extent that might be necessary to draw him out from his present position. This, at least, is a tedious process, but I thought it gave promise of some result, and was better than lying here destroying ourselves. The movement as I proposed it would have left this army in a strong position and safe, and would have made sure of the capture of Burnside. That is, the army could spare 20,000 men if it were in the position that I proposed better than it could spare 12,000, occupying the line that it now does.

## THE FORCE REQUIRED.

"Twenty thousand men well handled could surely capture Burnside and his force. Under present arrangements, however, the lines are to be held as they now are, and the detachment is to be, say 12,000. We thus expose both to failure and really take no chance to ourselves of great results.

"The only notice my plan received was a remark that General Hardee was pleased to make: 'I don't think that is a bad idea of Longstreet's.' I undertook to explain the danger of having such a long line under the fire of the enemy's batteries, and he concentrated, as it were, right in our midst and within twenty minutes march of any portion of our line. But I was assured that he would 'not disturb us.'

"I repeated my ideas, but they did not even receive notice. It was not till I had repeated it, however, that General Hardee even noticed me. Have you any maps that you can lend me? I shall need everything of the kind. Do you know any reliable people living near or east of Knoxville, from whom I might get information of the condition, strength, &c., of the enemy?

"I have written in such a hurry and confusion of packing and striking camp, that I doubt if I have made myself understood.

"I remain, very sincerely, your friend,  
"J. LONGSTREET,

"Lieutenant-General."

General Buckner responded to this request with what maps he had, but took the precaution to state that they were inaccurate.

The serene composure with which General Bragg assured his subordinate that they would "not be disturbed" was rudely broken when General Longstreet's command upon the morning of the 24th of November, and, sweeping three brigades from Lookout Mountain, planted the Stars and Stripes in triumph upon its crest.

It is possible, too, that when a day later the routed confederates were flying in dismay before the glittering steel of the Army of the Cumberland their commander may have recalled the prediction of General Longstreet. General Stevenson, whose force at Sweetwater was relieved by Longstreet's advance and ordered back to the main line, informed the latter that Burnside's force in East Tennessee was estimated at 23,000, a remarkably close calculation to be made by the commander of an opposing force, and strongly suggestive of spies about Burnside's headquarters. Longstreet seemed destined to meet obstacles at every step of his march, even before he came in sight of the Union lines. General Stevenson had had no intimation of Longstreet's movement and had provided no rations for his command. Indeed, he had been ordered to send those on hand back to Chattanooga.

In his official report, General Longstreet, after referring to the total lack of preparation made for his expedition, says: "As my orders were to drive the enemy out of East Tennessee or, if possible, capture him, I determined that the only possible chance of succeeding in either or both was to move and act as though I had a sufficient force to do either. I endeavored, therefore, to do as I should have done had the 30,000 men that I asked for been given me. Had the means been at hand for making the proper move I should have marched for the rear of Knoxville via Morgantown and Maryville, and gained possession of the heights there by forced marches. My transportation was so limited, however, that I could not spare a wagon to haul the pontons for our bridge. The only move that I could make under the circumstances was by crossing the river at Loudon where the cars delivered the bridge."

## A CAVALRY FIGHT.

General Wheeler arrived with his cavalry at Sweetwater on the 11th, and on the following day the entire command moved forward. Wheeler's orders were to "move by the most practicable route to Maryville, and endeavor to capture the enemy's force at that point, and otherwise make a diversion upon the enemy's flank."

The force stationed at Maryville was Colonel Frank Woolford's brigade, consisting of the

First, Eleventh, and Twelfth Kentucky cavalry, numbering 1,125 officers and men.

After detaching a force to guard the line of the Tennessee from the mouth of the Hawkswater to Loudon, Wheeler moved with the remainder of his two divisions, under command of Generals Martin and Armstrong, crossing the Tennessee at Malters' Ford at dark on the 13th, and making a night march to place his command in rear of Maryville. On approaching Maryville he learned that but one regiment was at the point, the Eleventh Kentucky, and he determined to attack it. Pushing forward with a portion of Dillibrell's brigade, he came suddenly upon it, while passing through a wood, drawn up in line of battle. Dillibrell charged and drove them some distance, when, being re-enforced by the remainder of the brigade, a sharp fight ensued, resulting in driving Woolford across Little River with a loss of over two hundred killed, wounded, and prisoners.

Emboldened by his success, Wheeler pushed on across Little River. On the following morning he came upon Woolford, who was now re-enforced by Pennebaker's brigade at the bridge over Stock Creek. Woolford had partially torn up the bridge, and the Union forces were posted in a strong and elevated position behind a fence enclosing a thick wood. In their front were open fields descending towards the river in which Wheeler was advancing. Their entire force was less than 1,500. On their right was the Holston River, while their left flank rested upon the steep side of a high ridge. Wheeler's command had no sooner made its appearance in the afternoon than Woolford opened with a rapid artillery fire upon the head of his column, wounding Major Buford, of Wheeler's staff.

## THE CAVALRY TURNS BACK.

Wheeler now dismounted Martin's division, and, crossing the creek under a heavy fire, made an attack upon the left of Woolford's line, driving it back. While this was in progress a force had been at work repairing the bridge, and soon Armstrong's division crossed it and charged upon the right, which resulted in driving the entire command back under cover of the guns in the fortifications on the heights south of Knoxville, when Wheeler turned back.

Longstreet does not seem to have placed a very high estimate upon this exploit of Wheeler. He says: "Wheeler was detached to surprise a cavalry force of the enemy at Maryville (reported to be a brigade), capture it, and move on to the rear of Knoxville, and endeavor to get possession of the heights on the south side, and to hold them till our arrival; or, failing in this, to threaten the enemy at Knoxville, so as to prevent the concentration of his forces around us before we reached Knoxville. He surprised the force at Maryville, only about 400 strong, captured a part, and dispersed the remainder. He moved on to Knoxville, but failed to get possession of any of the heights which commanded the town, but created the diversion in my favor."

Wheeler was now ordered to cross the Holston and join the right flank of Longstreet's army. As before mentioned, the transportation in Longstreet's command being limited to barely enough wagons to carry rations and ammunition, the pontoon bridge necessarily found a lodgment at the terminus of the railroad. The train conveying it was halted out of sight of the pickets of Chapin's brigade, and, under cover of night, run up to the river bank at Loudon, whence it was conveyed to Huff's Ferry, three or four miles below the town, where it was laid during the night of the 13th of November.

## DISCOVERY OF THE MOVEMENT.

Information of the movements of Longstreet in his front reached Colonel Chapin on the night of the 13th and a reconnaissance was at once ordered to Huff's Ferry, which demonstrated the fact that an advance across the Holston at that point was contemplated. General White at once withdrew Chapin's brigade to Lenoir's.

General Potter, in obedience to orders from General Burnside, destroyed the mills and factories and the pontoon bridge at Lenoir's and sent his baggage train to Knoxville. About noon of the 14th, Chapin's brigade, consisting of the Twenty-third Michigan, Thirtieth Kentucky, One Hundred and Eleventh Ohio and One Hundred and Seventh Illinois infantry and two batteries of artillery, supported by Ferrero's division of the Ninth Army Corps, retraced its steps towards Loudon. About four p. m. Chapin's advance encountered Longstreet's pickets about two-and-a-half miles north of the Holston, and a brisk skirmish at once ensued. The Thirtieth Kentucky, under command of its boy colonel, (William E. Hobson,) advanced gallantly in connection with the One Hundred and Seventh Illinois, (Lieutenant-Colonel Lowry,) and drove the confederate pickets back two miles. "Up to this time," says Chapin in his report, "the two regiments had been about equally engaged, but now the enemy seemed to concentrate in front of the Thirtieth Kentucky. The summit of the hill being wooded, made good cover for the rebels, and the side of the hill towards the Thirtieth Kentucky being bare, afforded no cover for our men, who were still in the woods at the foot."

## CHARGE OF THE THIRTIETH KENTUCKY.

General White now came upon the ground and ordered a charge to be made by the Thirtieth Kentucky and One Hundred and Seventh Illinois. "This was done," says Chapin, "in most gallant style by both regiments, the latter charging through the woods on the right and the Thirtieth Kentucky up the bare hill, in the face of a most galling fire driving the enemy off the hill, which position was held until morning." In the meantime, Hartranft's division had come up and was sent to a point opposite Loudon, where it remained until the next afternoon, when the entire command was withdrawn towards Lenoir's, Chapin's brigade acting as rear-guard. The Union troops had no sooner got into position at Lenoir's than, at four p. m., Longstreet's skirmishers appeared in their front. Longstreet complains, in his report, of the muddy condition of the roads, which prevented him from taking advantage of the retreat of the force in his front to punish it severely. "The ground was so muddy and the hills so high—almost mountains—that we were not able to get one division up and in position till after nightfall. Some of the troops were sent under guides after dark to get possession of the roads in the enemy's rear, and about midnight General Jenkins advanced his brigade and got possession of the only ground that the enemy could expect to occupy to give battle. When daylight came it was found that the guides had failed to put the troops upon the right road and that the enemy had during the night abandoned a part of his wagon train and made a hurried retreat." Referring to this movement, Potter says: "The enemy's skirmishers appeared in strong force before our position at Lenoir's about four p. m., and seemed disposed to push us in, but were

checked by a shell from Roemer's battery. About this time, Colonel Biddle (Seventy-first Indiana mounted infantry) responded with five or six hundred mounted men and Gitting's battery. I ordered him back to seize the junction of the Kingston and Loudon roads, near Campbell's Station, and to station a small force on the road to Clinton and Concord. General Hartranft, having reported for duty, I ordered him to move to the same point with what force I had of the Second division and the seven guns of Benjamin's and Van Schellen's batteries. Buckley's battery had already started for the same point, and Hartranft moved about dusk. I soon received a report from Biddle that the horses in his battery had given out and that he had dismounted some of his men and put the horses to the guns, but, owing to the fearful state of the roads, he could make no progress.

## ESCAPING FROM LENOIR'S.

Hartranft soon after reported that he could not move his artillery, although he had a brigade of infantry assisting, and had been obliged to destroy some ammunition and temporarily abandon limbers and caissons. About ten p. m. the enemy attempted to drive in our skirmishers, but were repulsed. Between four and five a. m. I received a number of mule teams from General White, that were given to the artillery, when it at once began to move. About six a. m. of the 16th Ferrero's division and Chapin's brigade of White's division, Twenty-third Corps, moved from Lenoir's, with Humphreys's brigade covering the rear. "The enemy followed at once, but showed no force or disposition to press us until within two miles of Campbell's, when they began to press heavily upon the rear, but were held in check by Humphreys."

Finding that it was impossible to move the artillery over the road from Lenoir's to Campbell's Station with the artillery horses, General White promptly burned his wagon train and used the mules to transport the artillery.

It will be observed by the military reader that the movement of Longstreet to place his troops between Lenoir's and Knoxville was anticipated by Burnside, who, by promptly moving Hartranft with his artillery to Campbell's Station, opened the way for the movement of the entire command to the same point at dawn of day.

## LONGSTREET OUTGENERALLED.

No more important move was made at any time during the operations that preceded the siege of Knoxville. Immediately on the arrival of Biddle and Sigfried, Hartranft had placed them in position, with a section of artillery on the Kingston road. After securing all the roads he sent two hundred of Biddle's mounted men along the Kingston road, with orders to go until they found the enemy, and attack at once. They had not far to go. Two miles and a half from Campbell's Station they came upon McLaws's advance. Finding that Potter's command had escaped him, Longstreet at once ordered a vigorous pursuit by Jenkins's division, while McLaws advanced on the right, with orders to "move forward as rapidly as possible and endeavor to intercept the enemy at Campbell's Station." Longstreet says: "Jenkins's sharpshooters pursued rapidly, skirmishing nearly all the time and making every effort to force the enemy to make a stand, but did not succeed in doing so until after he had passed Campbell's Station. He escaped General McLaws also, and took a strong position east of Campbell's Station." McLaws, deceived by the cavalry into the belief that it was the cover of a strong force in his front, did not attempt to push it until his force was well up, thus affording time for the remainder of Potter's force to gain position on the Knoxville road. Longstreet, now finding that his attempt to turn Potter's right and gain the Knoxville road in his rear had failed, determined upon a vigorous attempt to rout the force in his front, and, if it escaped him at all to send it into Knoxville in a demoralized condition. He had a sufficient force to warrant the expectation, about two to one of his opponent, 12,500 infantry and artillery, against 6,184. Longstreet says: "As soon as McLaws got up he was ordered to deploy three of his brigades in front of the enemy, and to put his other brigade upon a ridge on our left, so as to threaten the enemy's right. At the same time Colonel Alexander put his artillery in position, and Gen. Jenkins was ordered with his division around the enemy's left, and upon arriving opposite the enemy's position to make an attack upon that flank while General McLaws was advancing against the front to follow Jenkins's attack. McLaws's division advanced promptly and brought the enemy to a stand about a mile towards his rear, in a more commanding position. If General Jenkins could have made his attack during this movement, or if he could have made it after the enemy had taken his second position, we must have destroyed this force, recovered East Tennessee, and, in all probability, captured the greater portion of the enemy's force. He attributes his failure to do so to some misarrangement of General Law, commanding one of his brigades. Before I could get a staff officer to him to ascertain the occasion of his delay, night came on and our efforts ceased."

## FIGHT AT CAMPBELL'S STATION.

General Potter's report corroborates that of his antagonist. He says: "At 11 a. m. the enemy was pressing us heavily on both roads and turning Hartranft's right. Humphreys charged and drove them back on the Lenoir road, Hartranft's forces holding them back on the other. All the artillery and trains having passed the junction of the roads, and White being in position beyond the creek at Campbell's Station, in accordance with orders, I prepared to withdraw, having first placed Morrison's brigade of Ferrero's division below the junction of the two roads, with its right and left extending to them, and sending Biddle and Gitting's section of artillery to the rear, followed by the troops of Hartranft and Ferrero not in position." Having all the troops remaining on the same line, General Potter now ordered them to retire, and they fell back slowly to their new position, Humphreys first on the left, followed by Morrison and Sigfried, which, in the new position, placed Christ's brigade on the extreme right, with Morrison next and Humphreys in support of batteries, General White holding the centre. Hartranft was placed next, holding the left, with one regiment in support of batteries and one out of ammunition, in reserve. Benjamin's battery was placed on the right of the Knoxville road, with Gitting's on the right and Van Schellen's and Buckley's in the rear. Roemer's battery, near on the left of the road. On a small hill, near Chapin's brigade of White's division, the Twenty-fourth Indiana battery and Henshaw's Illinois battery, belonging to that division, were planted.

## [To be continued.]

The Mormons continue to send missionaries to Europe and to make converts to their doctrine by the hundred.

## A DEED OF DARING.

The True Story of the Capture of a  
Rebel Railway Train.

## A CLEVER SURPRISE.

That Twenty Minutes for  
Breakfast at Big Shanty.

## SUDDEN AND SUCCESSFUL START.

Their Race with Death and  
What Came of It.

[By Rev. Wm. Pittenger.]

The greater number of us arranged to pass the night at a small hotel adjoining the Marietta depot. Before retiring we left orders with the hotel clerk to rouse us in time for the northward bound train, due not long after daylight. Notwithstanding our novel situation, I never slept more soundly. Good health, extreme fatigue, and the feeling that the die was now cast and further thought useless, made me sink into slumber almost as soon as I touched the bed. Others, equally brave and determined, were affected in a different way. Alfred Wilson says:

"No man knows what a day may bring forth, and the very uncertainty of what that day's sun would bring forth in our particular cases was the reason that some of us, myself at least of the number, did not sleep very much. Our doom might be fixed before the setting of another sun. We might be hanging to the limbs of some of the trees along the railroad, with an enraged populace jeering and shouting vengeance because we had no more lives to give up; or we might leave a trail of fire and destruction behind us, and come triumphantly rolling into Chattanooga and Huntsville, with the Federal lines to receive the welcome plaudits of comrades left behind, and the thanks of our general, and the praises of a grateful people. Such thoughts as these passed in swift review, and were not calculated to make one sleep soundly."

As the hotel was much crowded, we obtained a few rooms in close proximity, and crowded them to their utmost capacity. Andrews noted our rooms before retiring, that he might, if necessary, seek any one of us out for consultation before we rose. Porter and Hawkins were unfortunately overlooked; they had arrived on an early train and obtained lodging at some distance from the depot. The clerk failed to have them called in time for the morning train, as they had ordered, and, greatly to their regret and chagrin, they were left behind. This was a serious loss, as they were both cool, brave men, and Hawkins was the most experienced railroad engineer of our company. W. F. Brown, who took his place in this work, was, however, fully competent, though possibly somewhat less cautious.

## MORNING AT LAST.

Long before the train was due, Andrews, who had slept little, if at all, that night, glided from room to room silently as a ghost, the doors being purposely left unfastened, and aroused the sleepers. It seemed to some of us scarcely a moment from the time of retiring until it became thus to the bedside of each sleeper in turn, and, cautiously awakening him, asked his name, to prevent the possibility of mistake, and then told each one exactly the part he was expected to take in the enterprise of the day. There was hasty dressing, and afterwards an informal meeting held in Andrews's room, at which nearly one-half of the whole number were present, and plans were more fully discussed. Then Marion A. Ross, one of the most determined of the whole number, took the bold step of advising and even urging the abandonment, for the present, of the whole enterprise. He reasoned with great force that under present circumstances, with the rebel vigilance fully aroused by Mitchell's rapid advance, with guards stationed around the train we were to capture, as we had learned would be the case at Big Shanty, and with the road itself obstructed by numerous trains, the enterprise was sure to fail, and would cost the life of every man engaged in it. Andrews very gently answered his arguments, and strove to show that the objections urged really weighed in favor of the original plan. No such attempt as we purposed had ever been made, and consequently would not be guarded against; the presence of a line of sentinels and of so many troops at Big Shanty would only tend to relax vigilance still further; and the great amount of business done on the road, with the running of many unscheduled trains, would screen us from close inquiry when we ran our train ahead of time. This reasoning was not altogether satisfactory, and some of the others joined Ross in a respectful but firm protest against persisting in such a hopeless undertaking. But Andrews, speaking very low, as was his wont when thoroughly in earnest, declared that he had once before postponed the attempt, and returned to camp disgraced. "Now," he continued, "I will accomplish my purpose or leave my bones to bleach in Dixie. But I do not wish to control any one against his own judgment. If any of you think it too hazardous, you are perfectly at liberty to take the train in the opposite direction and work your way back to camp as you can."

This inflexible determination closed the discussion, and as no man was willing to desert his leader, we all assured him of our willingness to obey his orders to the death. I had taken no part in the discussion, as I was not in possession of sufficient facts to judge of the chance of success, and I wished the responsibility to rest upon the leader, where it properly belonged.

## ALL ABOARD.

The train was now nearly due, and we proceeded to the station for the purchase of tickets. By the time they had been procured—not all for one place, as we wished to lessen the risk of suspicion—the train swept up to the platform. Hastily glancing at it in the early morning light, and seeing only that it was very long and apparently well filled, the twenty adventurers entered by different doors, but finally took their places in one car.

From Marietta to Big Shanty the railroad sweeps in a long bend of eight miles around the foot of Kennesaw Mountain, which lies directly between the two stations. This elevation is now scarred all over with rebel intrench-

ments, and was the scene of one of the severest contests of the war. This, however, as well as the whole of the three months' struggle from Chattanooga to Atlanta, came a year and a half later. At this time the nearest Federal soldiers were more than two hundred miles away.

When the train moved on and the conductor came to take our tickets we observed him carefully, as we knew not how closely his fate and ours might be linked together in the approaching struggle. The most vivid anticipation fell far short of the reality. Upon the qualities of that one man our success or failure hinged. He was quite young—not more than twenty-three or four,—and looked like a man of resolution and energy. We noticed that he was also scrutinizing us and the other passengers very closely, and naturally feared that he had, in some manner, been put on his guard. In fact, as we learned long afterwards, he had been warned that some of the new conscripts who were reluctant to fight for the confederacy were contemplating an escape, and might try to get a ride on the cars. His orders were to watch for all such and arrest them at once. But he did not think that any of the men who got on at Marietta looked in the least like conscripts or deserters.

The train ran slowly, stopping at several intervening points, and did not reach Big Shanty until it was fully daylight. This station had been selected for the seizure, because the train breakfasted there, and it was probable that many of the employees and passengers would leave it for their meal, thus diminishing the opposition we might expect. Another most important reason for the selection was the absence of any telegraph office. But, on the other hand, Camp McDonald had been lately located here, and a large body of soldiers—some accounts said as many as ten thousand men—were already assembled. Their camp included the station within the guard-line. When Andrews and the first party had been at Atlanta, three weeks earlier, few troops had yet arrived at this point. The capture of a train in the midst of a camp of the enemy was not a part of the original plan, but subsequently became necessary. It was certainly a great additional element of danger, but it was not now possible to substitute any other point.

## THE DECISIVE HOUR ARRIVES.

The decisive hour had arrived. It is scarcely boastful to say that the annals of history record few enterprises more bold and novel than that witnessed by the rising sun of Saturday morning, April 12, 1862. Here was a train, with several hundred passengers, with a full complement of hands, lying inside a line of sentinels, who were distinctly seen pacing back and forth in close proximity, to be seized by a mere score of men, and to be carried away before the track could be obstructed, or the intruding engineer shot down at his post. Only the most careful calculation and prompt execution, concentrating the power of the whole band into a single lightning-like stroke, could afford the slightest prospect of success. In the bedroom conference every action was predetermined with the nicest accuracy. Our engineer and his assistant knew the signal at which to start; the brakemen had their work assigned; the man who was to uncouple the cars knew just the place at which to make the separation; the remainder of the number constituted a guard, in two divisions, who were to stand with ready revolvers almost at the side of the cars to be seized, and shoot down without hesitation anyone who attempted to interfere with the work. Andrews was to command the whole, and do any part of the work not otherwise provided for. Should there be any unexpected hindrance, we were to fight until we either overcame all opposition and captured the train or perished in a body. If we failed to carry off our prize, we were inevitably lost; if any man failed to be on board when the signal was given, his fate also was sealed. A delay of thirty seconds after our designs became clearly known would have resulted in the slaughter of the whole party.

When our train rolled up to the platform the usual announcement was shouted, "Big Shanty; twenty minutes for breakfast!" Most fortunately for us, the conductor, engineer, firemen, and train-hands generally, with many of the passengers, poured out, and hurried to the long, low eating-room which gave its name to the station. The engine was utterly unguarded. This uncommon carelessness was the result of perfect security, and greatly favored our design. Yet it was a thrilling moment! Victory or death hung on the next minute! There was no chance for drawing back, and I do not think any of us had the disposition. A little while before, a sense of shrinking came over the writer like that preceding a plunge into ice-water; but with the next breath it passed away, and left me as calm and quiet as if no enemy had been within a hundred miles. Still, for a moment, we kept our seats. Andrews went forward to examine the track and see if there was any hindrance to a rapid rush ahead.

## ALL RIGHT, BOYS!

Almost immediately he returned, and said, very quietly, "All right, boys; let us go now." There was nothing in this to attract special observation; but whether it did or did not was now a matter of indifference. The time of concealment was passed. We rose, left the cars, and walked briskly to the head of the train. With the precision of machinery, every man took his appointed place. Three cars back from the tender the coupling-pin was drawn out, as the lead of passenger-cars would only have been an embarrassment. Wilson W. Brown, who acted as engineer, William Knight as assistant, Alfred Wilson as fireman, together with Andrews, mounted the engine, Knight grasping the lever, and waiting the word for starting. The appointed brakemen threw themselves flat on the top of the cars. At a signal from Andrews, the remainder of the band, who had kept watch, climbed with surprising quickness into a box-car which stood open. All was well! Knight, at Andrews's orders, jerked open the steam-valve, and we were off! Before the camp-guards or the bystanders could do more than turn a curious eye upon our proceedings, the train was under way, and we were safe from interruption.

The writer was stationed in the box-car, and as soon as all were in, we pulled the doors shut to guard against any stray musket-balls. For a moment of most intense suspense after we were thus shut in all was still. In that moment a thousand conflicting thoughts swept through our minds. Then came a pull, a jar, a clang, and we were flying away on our perilous journey. Those who were on the engine caught a glimpse of the excited crowd, soldiers and citizens, swarming and running about in the wildest confusion. It has been said that a number of shots were fired off by us, but those in the box-car knew nothing of it, and it is certain that no one was injured. A widely-circulated picture represented us as waving our hats and shouting in triumph. Nothing so melodramatic took place. The moment was too deep and earnest, and we had too many perils